'Efficient practice precedes the theory of it; methodologies presuppose the application of the methods, of the critical investigation of which they are the products. It was because Aristotle found himself and others reasoning now intelligently and now stupidly and it was because Izaak Walton found himself and others angling sometimes effectively and sometimes ineffectively that both were able to give their pupils the maxims and prescriptions of their arts.' 1
Introduction
This paper explores the approach of Margot Brazier to the role and nature of medical and health care law in an important academic paper on informed consent and argues that it exemplifies a distinctive methodology that can be traced through into areas of her later public service work (in particular, the policy review into surrogacy law that she chaired). Margot avoided grand theorising in order to focus on practical issues. In doing so, she modelled the relationship between legal scholarship and the real world of health care practice -an evidence based approach to doing good through the application of the discipline of law. She was, thus, no ivory tower academic, but a good citizen.
Gilbert Ryle contrasted propositional knowledge ('knowing that') with 'know-how'. 2 He reflected on the fact that a person could learn to play chess without being expert in the formal rules: 'We learn how by practice, schooled indeed by criticism and example, but often unaided by any lessons in theory. ' 3 He concluded that 'knowing how, then, is a disposition…. Its exercises are observances of rules or canons or the applications of criteria but they are not tandem operations of theoretically avowing maxims and then putting them into practice.' 4 There is something of this 'know how' approach in the method adopted by Brazier to the practice of law. As we shall see, her approach was firmly rooted in the practices that were being regulated and did not proceed by first establishing principles and then translating them into law. It is not that she ignored propositional knowledge. Indeed, she made significant contributions to the understanding of doctrine by both law students and legal practitioners. However, she built her analysis around the practices of health care rather than principles of law or ethical theory abstracted from this context. Consequently, she put herself in a position to critique the disciplines of both law and medicine rather than merely to subject health professionals to the will of lawyers. 6 As Ryle suggests with
Aristotle and Izaak Walton, she proceeded by identifying the intelligent and effective practice of law, so as to derive the maxims and prescriptions from such practice. She did not dictate to practice on the basis of theory.
Something of the flavour of Margot's approach can be seen by comparing the opening of her article on informed consent, following the Sidaway decision, with that of the leading exponent of a more principle-based approach, Ian Kennedy. The main protagonists in Margot's opening paragraph are patients. They are said to have rarely sued until recently, received 'scant sympathy from Her Majesty's judges', be 'less and less willing to accept without complaint the results of injurious treatment.
2 Ryle chapter 2. 3 Ryle at p 41. 4 Ryle at p 47. 5 Through, for example editing Street on Torts (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) 8 th to 11 th editions), a student text, and Clerk and Lindsell on Tort (1995, 17 th ed, London: Sweet & Maxwell) in the Common Law Library -a mark of its canonical status for practitioners. 6 Tony Hope has criticised the approach of some lawyers in these terms, R.A. Hope, 'The Birth of Medical Law' (1991) 11 OJLS 247-53.
They are more and more inclined to question their doctor's judgment.' 7 The picture she paints of the context of the litigation is one that needs to respond to patient activity.
The opening of Kennedy's piece does not mention patients at all. He begins with the following paragraph:
'Medical law used to be fun. All you had to do was read a lot of strange American cases, the odd Commonwealth decision and maybe some English nineteenth-century cases on crime then you could reflect that none of these was relevant and get on with the fun of inventing answers. Suddenly, in the last few years, the courts have got into the act. Cases have come rattling along. Medical law is beginning to get a corpus of law. Medical lawyers are having to do homework.'
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His interest, and this was reflected the bulk of contemporary medical law writing, was in the law. His motivation, as his writing makes clear, lies in protecting the rights of patients in the face of an imbalance of power. He does little, however, to call into question the legitimacy of using the law to redress those imbalances. Nor does he devote space to exploring what actually happens in the clinic when the law comes into play.
The significance of these different approaches can be seen from a fuller comparison of Margot Brazier's work on Sidaway with other articles published in the law journals at the time. A picture of her method can be constructed and its distinctive features identified. The implications of this approach go beyond the enterprise of academic law, and an exploration of some of Margot's public service work will enable this to be drawn out, again with comparison to other ways of approaching similar issues. It will be contended that the example set by Margot provides a richer understanding of the role and nature of the law in health care and a more robust foundation for law reform than the work with which it is being compared. In this way, although her work avoids any attempt to construct a theory of health care law, it does provide a model for the methodology of scholarship in the field, including the wider role of legal academics in contributing to public life. However, even here the pattern emerges. The focus is on the arguments as presented by the courts, analysed for consistency and found wanting. Grubb notes that the Court of Appeal's argument was built on a non-sequitur when it concluded that because the identification of risks must be a matter for the medical profession it followed that which risks should be disclosed was also a matter for professional judgement. 18 When the policy issues are considered, the presentation in the case note is of assertion and counter-assertion, with no basis offered for showing which is the more convincing. Thus, Grubb contradicts Browne-Wilkinson LJ's suggestion that full disclosure would undermine the relationship of trust and confidence between doctor and patient by saying that the opposite was in fact the case as 'Secrecy undermines such a relationship; it does not enhance it'. 19 Grubb then speculates as to what most patients will want, but without reference to any empirical evidence to show whether his assessment was based on evidence or assumption. 20 Turning to the use by Browne-Wilkinson LJ and Dunn LJ of the 'spectre of "defensive medicine"' ('like all ghosts, it disappears on closer examination') 21 Grubb asserts reasons for rejecting their concerns, but cites no empirical evidence. This is understandable in a journal that permits no footnotes and little space for its case notes, but it makes it hard to determine the force of arguments that depend, at least in part on an assessment of the realities of clinical practice. Instead, the focus was the internal logic of legal doctrine, judged against unexplored policy assumptions (as it was of the judgments being analysed).
The primacy of ethics?
Ian Kennedy's contributions, a case note in the Modern Law Review on the ruling of Court of Appeal 22 and a later postscript on the decision of the House of Lords, 23 were less constrained by such journal requirements. However, his work displays a similar approach. Kennedy asserts the primacy of ethics over law, suggesting that 'informed consent' belongs to the former discipline not the latter. 24 He roots it in the principle of respect for autonomy and sees it as essentially about power and its transfer to patients so as to 'create the optimal relationship between doctor and patient, which is the same as that between any professional and his client -namely a partnership of shared endeavour in pursuit of the client's interests.' 25 The law should be analysed to see how far 'it reflected and gave effect to good medical ethics…, having regard to matter such as evidence and the burden of proof and the extent to which these may give unfair advantage to one party or another.' 26 Kennedy then turns to address the policy endorsed by the court, which he submitted was 'both unjustified and inappropriate' because most patients and doctors did not want it and good medical practice would be 'sadly damaged'. 27 Little direct evidence was offered of what patients want from their doctors, although reference was made in general terms to the fourth chapter of the Report of the US President's Commission for the Study of Ethical and Legal Problems in Medicine and the empirical evidence that it generated.
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In part, this structure follows from Kennedy's conceptualisation of medical law as subservient to ethics. From this paradigm, philosophical and conceptual analysis is predominant. 29 Thus, Kennedy presents the US Commission's use of empirical work as a way of testing the principle of informed consent, as if it was a hypothesis, rather than building the desired legal model from what we understand about the realities of the doctor patient relationship. The Commission's report 'is a brilliant work, not least because two volumes are dedicated to examining, through careful research, the various anecdotes about informed consent, and to comparing the evidence with the myth.'
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The conceptual structure comes first; the empirical issues follow.
Taking multi-disciplinary work seriously
Brazier's approach differs in a number of interesting ways. She begins from what life is like from the patient's perspective, and is open to the contributions from a wide range of disciplines to make sense of the law's role in their experiences. Out of this broad-based understanding of the world in which the law is operating, she then seeks to build a legal framework that meets the needs of society as she sees them. such a multi-disciplinary base and Margot Brazier's example here is an important one.
Brazier recognises the need to explore the strength of empirical evidence, rather than just the conclusions drawn from it by the President's Commission. Thus, she cites a number of the original studies and acknowledges the need to consider their methodological validity (although she does not explore this directly). 31 If the purpose of the law is, in part, to facilitate effective health care, then it is important to understand what will actually happen as a consequence of the legal rules being discussed. This is far more complex than might be imagined, and can be considered at a number of levels. Many commentators have noted the risks of proliferation of bureaucratic paperwork, with unsatisfactory results for both patients and health professionals. 32 This shows the need to understand how health care institutions will respond to particular legal incentives in order to judge the likely range of consequences, desired and undesired, of particular legal principles. Nor is it sufficient to consider the doctor-patient relationship out of its social and institutional context. This is recognised in the realisation that the economics of litigation, including the way in which lawyers and doctors get paid, are important factors in understanding the impact of informed consent. 33 In summary, using the empirical evidence to test pre-existing abstract conceptual positions, even those built on the rhetoric of patients' rights, rather than to illuminate the social practices that the law is regulating, is too narrow a view. Brazier's wider vision is crucial to a full understanding of health care law.
Constructing doctrine -court or clinic?
A difference of emphasis can be seen between Kennedy and Brazier's consideration of a subjective test for disclosure. That is, a requirement that doctors disclose those facts that the particular patient (as opposed to an objective 'reasonable patient') would regard as material. Brazier is more concerned to understand how legal rules will operate in the clinic. The principle audience to be considered in evaluating the legal rules is the doctor rather than the judge. For her 'the debate about informed consent is only marginally about legal rules' 41 and it would be preferable to establish the norms of medical practice in a way that 'would make recourse to the law largely unnecessary.'
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Focusing on the forensic context undermines role that Brazier identifies for the law, which 'should provide a clear and certain framework for the discharge of professional obligations. Too many grey areas afflict the judge-made rules…. And for the doctor the 'rules' governing his advice and counsel to patients are so bedevilled by fine distinctions and 'nice' points of law that he needs a law degree to understand his obligations of disclosure.'
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For Brazier, the law needs to be comprehensible to doctors. It is the way in which they interpret it which will make the biggest difference to patients. 
The audience for health care law
Harvey Teff also demonstrates a concern with the impact of the law in the clinic. He shows how Sidaway is premised on a model of medical paternalism and argues in favour of an alternative model of therapeutic alliance. 44 He shares Brazier's concern with facilitating effective health care, offering the therapeutic benefits of patient involvement in decisions as one of the justifications for his model. 45 He too recognises the importance of understanding the practical impact of legal decisions, observing that awareness of the law amongst doctors may be limited so that 'legal criteria of informed consent have had only a marginal impact on the behaviour of medical practitioners, even in the United States.' He concludes that 'it seems unlikely that the introduction of informed consent into English law would have much effect on medical practice without effective strategies to alter attitudes among practitioners.'
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Teff does not go on to explore strategies to change attitudes, but Brazier's piece does. She advocated a standing commission on medical law and ethics, with its first task to investigate the problem of informed consent. 47 The idea of such a commission was common to many leading medical law academics at the time, 48 but the model envisaged by Brazier was illuminating. She suggested that what was needed was a solution achieved 'via co-operation not confrontation' through a body comprising medical and legal expertise and representing both doctors' and patients' interests. 49 informed consent. This invites us to turn to the processes for formulating reforms of the law, which Brazier expects to 'reflect the expectations of the community', 53 and to be co-produced with the medical profession. Margot Brazier has made a distinguished and distinctive contribution to policy making, which further develops her method of working, and this is the subject of the final sections of this paper.
The Foundations of Law Reform
In 1997 Margot Brazier chaired a committee that was asked to review the need for the regulation of surrogacy arrangements, including issues relating to payments, and to advise on the need for changes to the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 and/or section 30 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 54 In the same year another review was undertaken, of a different aspect of fertility law by another eminent law professor. In the aftermath of the Blood case on posthumous conception, 55 Sheila McLean was asked to consider various issues in the law of consent; whether there were circumstances in which explicit consent to removal of gametes might be waived, whether written consent to storage was always to be required or whether other aspects of the consent requirements under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 needed to be changed. 56 Both reviews proceeded on the basis of consultation, but interesting differences can be seen in the approaches taken. Once again, Margot Brazier's approach was to build analysis on an understanding of the social practices that might need to be regulated. In contrast, and like many other medical lawyers, Sheila McLean worked within the conceptual structure and perspective of the law.
The social reality of the legal 'problems'
The approach taken by the Brazier Committee placed the actual practice of surrogacy and the value questions that it raises at the centre of its considerations, not the drafting of the existing law. They 'set out, therefore, to obtain as much factual evidence as we could about the practice of surrogacy in the UK, and abroad; about its development since the especially COTS (Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy). A survey of Guardians ad Litem (who would be involved in associated court proceedings, representing the children's interests) elicited information on cases that had reached the legal system. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority provided data on surrogacy arrangements that used the regulated IVF technologies and further information was available from a British Fertility Society survey. From this detective work, the Committee felt able to estimate that there were between 100 and 180 surrogate arrangements annually, leading to between 40 and 50 surrogacy births in England. 59 It also considered surrogacy was being used for convenience rather than for medical reasons, a significant concern at the time of the Warnock report that was found to be 'totally ethically unacceptable', 60 and concluded that there was no evidence of this happening. 61 Consequently, little space was devoted to this issue as it did not arise in real life.
The Review Committee also sought to understand the experiences of those actually involved in surrogacy arrangements. 62 It analysed the consultation responses so as to understand views from those who had actually been involved in arrangements as well as commentators without this personal experience. Of the 369 responses, 38 came from surrogate mothers and 79 from commissioning parents. 63 The Report also distinguished the views of members of COTS from others so that differences could be seen. 64 Oral hearings and a seminar were held to supplement the consultation responses. 65 This attempt to shape the policy making process by the experiences of those involved in it is rather different from the approach taken in many consultation processes. It is far more common to take the shape of the process from the conceptual tools already available to the policy makers. The differences can be illustrated by comparing the approach adopted by the other review from 1997 into law and fertility.
Discourses of public ethics
The questions asked in McLean's consultation process were defined in the terms of the pre-existing legal structure. 66 Thus, respondents were asked what the consequences of permitting non-consensual removal of gametes would be for the general law of consent (Q2), implying that the internal consistency of the law was as interesting to the project as whether or not such removal should be permitted (Q1). Rather than asking when and why such removal might be acceptable, the consultation canvasses whether or not it can be fitted into the legal categories of 'best interests of the patient' (Q3), 'necessity' (Q4) or 'substituted judgment' (Q5). The key point here is that the approach adopted assumes the validity of the conceptual framework that the law had developed.
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This can be seen even more clearly in relation to the export of posthumously harvested gametes for treatment elsewhere in the European Union (the issue litigated by Diane Blood). Here, the consultation document asked two questions, both of which are about legal interpretation rather than the policy that the law might wish to enshrine. Question 10 asked whether 'the HFEA's discretion to permit export [can] be interpreted in such a way as to permit the export of gametes which have been unlawfully obtained?' Question 11 asked whether 'there [is] a need for clarification of the provisions of s.24(4) concerning export?' Respondents who advocated a fundamental change of policy might reasonably suggest that 'clarification' is too weak a word and that reform was required. They might also consider that whether or not the existing discretion can be 'interpreted' in the way suggested is rather less significant than whether export should be allowed and whether the decision to permit it should be a matter of the regulator's discretion at all (rather than the applicant's right). The adoption of the existing legal framework within the consultation document thus obscures deeper policy questions.
A further illustration of the problems of constraining consultation responses by the existing legal provisions can be seen in the response from Diane Blood, published in the journal Human Reproduction. 68 After giving an account of the reasons for her views on the policy question of posthumous donation of gametes, she discusses two aspects of the law. One was the proper interpretation of the judgments in the case that she brought and of its implications as seen by counsel (her own and those for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority). This raises some interesting issues about the limitations of analysis done on the basis of the texts of judgments (and statutes) without full understanding of the way they are used and applied in practice -a theme also present in Brazier's analysis of informed consent law. Diane Blood had privileged access to material that academics can rarely see (a privilege that brings both advantages and disadvantages in terms of objective argumentation) and her perspective is illuminating but not germane to the points being explored in this piece.
The second aspect of the law covered in Diane Blood's response was expressed by her to be concerned with the legal concept of 'best interests' but was in fact addressed to points raised by McLean about the legal doctrine of 'necessity'. 69 The subtlety of the distinction between these two principles may be of interest to lawyers, but it is unnecessary to explore it to address the policy question of whether posthumous non-consensual harvesting of gametes should be permitted. If policy does require it to be allowed, then it may be that clarification of the definitions of 'necessity' or 'best interests' is a sensible way to proceed. However, it seems at least as likely that a bespoke legal solution would be needed, setting out the circumstances and conditions in which harvesting should be permitted. Putting the legal doctrines before the policy is a little like 'putting the cart before the horse'.
The consultation questions posed by the Brazier Committee were different in kind.
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Rather than focussing on the precise terms of the law, views were sought on the underlying policy questions. Should there be a blanket ban on payments (Q1)?
If not, what categories of payment should be permitted (Qs 2-4)? Should there be a body to regulate surrogacy arrangements or agencies (Q6)? Should it be mandatory to for agencies to be authorised (Q8) and should people making surrogacy arrangements be obliged to use an agency (Q9)? There is no need to have an understanding of either the details or the terminology of the law to answer these questions. The consultation process seeks to engage with the language, concepts and ideas used by non-professionals. It sought to understand opinion on the issues in its own terms rather than requiring respondents to make sense of the language used by lawyers.
The Brazier committee thus built its consideration of the case for reform outside of the conceptual structures of the law. There is an attempt to understand the practice of surrogacy from the perspective of those involved, not merely as an idea to be examined in a disinterested manner as a matter of principle(s). This approach sees the foundations of good policy analysis as based on a rich understanding of the practices to be regulated and the value questions that they raise. Specific legal responses need to be built on these social practices and values rather than from professional disciplines, whether of bioethics or law. The discourse of 'public ethics' should be rooted in social practice rather than an imposition upon it by professional outsiders.
Value-based analysis
In order to achieve this, the Brazier report approached their task in a rather different way to McLean. They explained it as requiring them to 'analyse the underlying social, ethical and legal issues inherent in surrogacy arrangements as we perceive them in 1998… address the psychological implications of surrogacy arrangements, consider how procreative liberty and welfare may be balanced, and examine the role of law in such a personal and intimate area of human life.'
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The starting point was values and attitudes, with the proper role of law being one of the questions to be explored. It was not to be assumed that the law had a role at all, nor that its role could be developed within the existing legal categories. The Committee hoped that 'Responses to the consultation paper will help to inform the review team of current public and professional attitudes towards surrogacy arrangements. In this sensitive and highly personal area of human conduct it is essential that any review of the law and practice is conducted on the widest possible base of information.' 72 The work of the Committee was constrained by the exclusion of certain policy options -in particular, that of a commercial market with specifically enforceable contracts to give up the child. However, this was the result of their explicit rejection by the Government when the review was commissioned. 73 The legitimacy of these limitations therefore lies in the democratic authority of the Minister. In contrast, McLean's approach seemed to confer an assumed legitimacy on the conceptual structure of the very legal framework that she was commissioned to evaluate.
The interest in attitudes and values also meant that the Brazier review was less concerned with the conclusions previously reached by policy makers and lawyers than in the reasons behind them. Thus, the account of Warnock inquiry explores both the majority and minority views and concentrates on their rationales not how many members of the committee adopted them. 74 Similarly, the summary of the
Glover report explains what problems it thought could and should be avoided as well as noting that it concluded that a restrictive approach should be taken. 75 The summary of issues to be addressed in 1998 identified the need to safeguard the welfare of the children; to protect the interests of the surrogate, her family and the commissioning couple (noting that the right of the state to intervene in the choices of adults was itself controversial); to consider whether payment contravened ethical values or increased the risks involved in surrogacy. 76 The Report could be criticised for failing to analyse the nature of these values in sufficient depth, 77 but the point here is that public policy was seen as an expression of values rather than legal doctrine. This places the framework for critique outside of the law, rather than within it (as implied in McLean's consultation document). It also looks to identify these values from the attitudes of those engaged in practices rather than in the discipline of bioethics (the approach in Kennedy's piece on Sidaway).
Law and policy -a therapeutic turn?
The final area with which this paper is concerned is way in which Brazier's work has developed an understanding of the importance of processes, both within regulatory systems and of law reform. Much medical law scholarship has concentrated on the substantive questions of whether medical practices or scientific advances should be proscribed or limited, to the detriment of consideration of the way in which regulation might operate. This paper noted earlier Brazier's interest in 'soft law' in the form of codes of practice as a possible solution to informed consent law. The Surrogacy Review develops this area of analysis further and can be seen as an approach that considers the impact of legal processes as an area of study in its own right. Used well, processes might contribute to the therapeutic operation of health services. Constructed badly, they might undermine it. This theme can be extended into the policy making process too. The Brazier Committee articulated an understanding of their consultation exercise that was more a conversation than survey of views. This raises interesting questions about the contribution that can be made by the wellhandled oversight of policy matters and can be explored further in the work of the Retained Organs Commission, which Margot Brazier chaired, between 2001 and 2004.
The importance of processes
One interesting strand of the Surrogacy's review's proposals is the interest in incentives, enforcement and processes. It went beyond the issue of whether payment should be permitted or prohibited -a binary question -to consider how concerns about exploitation might be addressed. Thus, an analogy with adoption is found attractive in part because it would be more inquisitorial than adversarial; allowing the suitability of commissioning parents to be fully considered, ensuring representation for the child and giving the judge the necessary powers to give full weight to their welfare. 78 It is the requirement to undertake this process, rather than
